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I. INTRODUCTION

A reformulation of the international regime governing the use of force
is desperately needed. States no longer regard the rules structure regulating
the use of force that is in place, based as it is on the U.N. Charter, as
obligatory. Between 1945 and 2006, 118 of the 192 U.N. Member-States
fought approximately 291 conflicts in which over 18 million people died.'
In the past decade alone, the United States has sent military forces into
hostile places around the world, including Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
* Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James 0. Browning, U.S. District Court for the District
of New Mexico; J.D./M.A. University of California, Berkeley, 2006. I would like to thank
Professors Weber and Yoo for their counsel and direction, and Douglas and Carolyn Fisher for their
assistance and support.
1. See Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2006,
http://www.members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2006); Iraq Coalition
Troops: Non-U.S. Forces in Iraq, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_
orbat coalition.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2007); U.N. Member States: List of Member States,
availableat http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2007).
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the Philippines, and Haiti. It has also fought, over the period of the last
five years, three major wars against other sovereign nation-states-the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Under the current
rules governing the use of force, as the international legal academy
generally interprets and applies them, each of those three conflicts was
illegal.' As the above examples of relatively recent U.S. action
demonstrate, the international legal framework concerning the use of force
is out-of-sync with how states actually behave. State behavior has proven
what the eminent diplomat, George F. Kennan, wrote regarding the
Charter's use of force regime years ago, that a "legalistic-moralistic
approach to international problems" would fail in a world of "chaotic and
dangerous aspirations."3
Several international legal experts have acknowledged the enormous
disconnect between the present use of force regime and actual state
practice.' For example, Professor Michael Glennon describes the divide as
resembling a parallel universe comprised of two international systems, one
de jure and one de facto.5 The de jure system consists of the current
Charter-based rules regulating the use of force among states; it does not
exist.6 The de facto system consists of actual state behavior in the real
world, a world in which states base their actions on an analysis of costs
and benefits and ignore the overly idealized rules adhered to in the de jure
system.7 Despite the existence of such a disconnect, however, the
international legal community as a whole, which Professors Louis Henkin
and Thomas Franck perhaps represent best, has consistently refused to
reinterpret the existing use of force framework.8 Professors Henkin and
Franck argue that the current regime forms the basis of the only correct
rules for the use of force, that, although they break them regularly, states
will eventually accept those rules, and that, therefore, the rules should not
2. See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 729 (2004); see also Thomas M.
Franck, What Happens Now? The United States After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 614 (2003);
Michael J. Glennon, The Fog ofLaw: Self-Defense, Inherence,and Incoherencein Article 51 ofthe
United Nations Charter,25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 543-44 (2002); Abraham D. Sofaer,
InternationalLaw and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J.INT'L L. 1, 2-4 (2000).

3. GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 95 (1984).
4. Seegenerally Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security CouncilFailed,FOREIGN AFF., MayJune 2003, at 16-17; Franck, supra note 2, at 607; Sofaer, supranote 2, at 5.
5. Glennon, supra note 2, at 540.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Sofaer, supra note 2, at 7; see generally Thomas M. Franck, Sidelined in Kosovo?
Break It, Don't Fake It, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1999, at 118; Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law
and US. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37, 53 (Louis

Henkin et al., 2d ed. 1991).
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be recast in response to current state practice.9 This idealistic vision has
combined with a common tendency on the part of many international
lawyers to conflate the use of force with evil itself, resulting in a narrow
reading of and straightj acketed approach to the use of force rules."° Instead
of displaying an unwillingness to address the gap between state behavior
and the current rules on the use of force, an unwillingness that threatens
to make international law wholly irrelevant to states' use of force
decisions, 1 the international legal establishment might consider to what
extent rules that intrusively interfere with how states pursue their interests
are capable of advancing the broader U.N. goals of providing international
peace and security.
At least one international law scholar has gone so far as to argue that
states have violated the use of force regime so openly and so often that it
has already collapsed. 2 Adopting that position, Professor Glennon
contends that three international legal doctrines, whether considered
together or separately, have rendered the international use of force rules
nonobligatory."3 First, he maintains that numerous states' massive
violation of the Charter over a prolonged period has cast it into
desuetude. 14
Second, he argues that state violations of the regime have established
subsequent custom, creating new law that supplants the Charter-based
rules and that permits conduct that was previously illegal. 5 Third, he
insists that state behavior contrary to the use of force rules has created a
non-liquet, throwing international law concerning the use of force into
such confusion as to make its authoritative application impossible. 6 While
I am not sure if I agree that the U.N.-based international use of force
regime has already fallen by the wayside, I find it troubling that the
argument can be made at all, let alone so persuasively.
To prevent the U.N. Charter system from ending up as a mere
collection of paper rules, the international legal academy must overcome
its intransigence and confront the divide that exists between state practice
and the current rules concerning the use of force. The international legal
order must be reevaluated and then reformulated to reflect the underlying

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Sofaer, supra note 2, at 7.
Id. at 18. See also Henkin, supra note 8, at 61.
Sofaer, supra note 2, at 20.
Glennon, supranote 4, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22-23.
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dynamics of power and security. To be effective, rules must flow from
how states actually behave, not how they ought to.17
To gain an understanding of the issues and dynamics that an updated
international use of force regime will have to address in order to improve
upon the present rules structure, it is necessary to turn to the field of
international relations. Within international relations, it is widely accepted
that realism provides the most adept description and explanation of
interstate security relations. 8 Realist theory supplies several foreign policy
theories, or strategies, which lay out when states should resort to force.' 9
While foreign policy theories derived from realism could be developed to
explain and predict the actions of any state, this Article focuses on
comprehending what drives American foreign policy and U.S. decisions
to use force. Appreciating the factors underlying American foreign policy
is especially important because the United States was the primary advocate
for establishing the international legal order that is currently in place,2" it
engages in military operations more frequently and of greater intensity
than most other states,2" and, because of its unique position in the world,
it is likely to be the driving force behind any change to the existing use of
force regime.22 Understanding the interests and priorities that the United
States will use force to protect is, therefore, critical to reformulating the
use of force rules in a way that accounts for actual state practice.
This Article explores the efficacy of the international rules that
determine when resorting to force is appropriate,jus ad bellum.23 It does
so by comparing the elements that presently determine the legality of a
state's decision to use force, as the international legal community
generally interprets them, with the motivations that actually underlie such
a decision. In doing so, this Article seeks to provide part of the foundation
on which an alternative use of force regime, one that takes account of how
17. Glennon, supra note 4, at 31.
18. See Jack S. Levy, The Causes of War andConditions ofPeace, ANN. REV. POL. SCI., June
1998, at 144-46.
19. See, e.g., id.; Robert J. Art, The Strategy of Selective Engagement, in THE USE OF FORCE:
MILITARY POWER AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 299 (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 6th ed. 2004);
Michael Mastanduno, Preservingthe UnipolarMoment: RealistStrategiesand U.S. GrandStrategy
After the Cold War, 21 INT'L SECURITY 60 (1997).
20. See WALTER A. McDOuGAL, PROMISED LAND, CRUSADER STATE: THE AMERICAN

1776, at 151-53 (1997); THOMAS G. PATERSON ET AL.,
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: A HISTORY SINCE 1895, at 200-03 (2000).
21. See Center for Systemic Peace, supra note 1.
22. Joseph S. Nye, The American NationalInterest and GlobalPublicGoods, 78 INT'LAFF.
239-40 (2002).
23. LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 920 (4th ed.
2001).
ENCOUNTER WITH THE WORLD SINCE
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states actually behave, can be built. Part II of the Article lays out the
current jus ad bellum rules structure. Part I discusses basic realist
assumptions about state behavior and introduces three realist inspired
foreign policy strategies-balance-of-threat preponderance, balancer of
last resort, and selective engagement-that identify instances in which the
United States should use force and help explain and predict American
decisions to do so. Part IV addresses and attempts to illuminate the
disconnect between the U.N. Charter-based rules structure governing the
use of force and actual state practice by examining five recent U.S.
decisions to resort to force-Gulf War I, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Gulf War II. Each American action is evaluated in terms of its legality
and its consistency with the three realist foreign policy strategies.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE USE OF FORCE
The U.N. Charter is primarily responsible for governing the use of
force in international affairs.24 The victors of the Second World War
designed the Charter regime to eliminate war. It essentially prohibits a
state from using force unless it has prior U.N. Security Council approval
to do so or is acting in self-defense. 26 The Charter's basic provision
restricting the use of force is Article 2(4).27 It commands states to "refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.,"28 Despite
the inclusion of the "against the territorial integrity or political
independence" language in the article, 29 2(4) is generally assumed to
preclude all uses of force, including humanitarian intervention,3" except
those that the Security Council authorizes or that are allowed as selfdefense. 3 The flipside of 2(4), Article 2(3) commits states to settling "their

24. See id.at 933-34.
25. See id.; Yoo, supra note 2, at 736-37.
26. John C. Yoo, Kosovo, WarPowers,andtheMultilateralFuture, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1673,
1725 (2000).
27. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use ArmedForce, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1624
(1984).

28. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
29. Id.
30. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW INTHEORY AND PRACTICE 123-25 (1991);

Schachter, supra note 27, at 1629.
31. Schachter, supra note 27, at 1625.
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international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 32
The U.N. system envisions a collective response, as opposed to a selfhelp response, to unlawful aggression.33 U.N. member-states are expected
to confront illegal threats to international peace by implementing
countermeasures that the Security Council authorizes.34 Article 39 grants
the Security Council the authority to "determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and to "decide what
measures," non-violent or violent, shall be taken to "maintain or restore
international peace and security. 35 Article 41 permits the Security Council
to authorize measures short of force, such as economic sanctions and the
severance of diplomatic relations, 6 and Article 42 expressly gives the
Security Council the power to approve "operations by air, sea, or land
forces" if it decides that non-violent measures have proven "inadequate." 37
Recognizing, however, that the Security Council cannot act
immediately to check illegal aggression, the Charter regime preserves a
state's "inherent" right to use force in its self-defense. 8 Article 51
proclaims that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain.., international peace and security.39
Although there is some debate regarding the scope of Article 51's
exception to the general prohibition of the use of force,4" most
32. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
33. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
34. See U.N. Charter art. 43, para. 1.
35. U.N. Charter art. 39.
36. U.N. Charter art. 41.
37. U.N. Charter art. 42.
38. See U.N. Charter art. 51; see also Yoo supranote 2, at 737-38.
39. U.N. Charter art. 5 1.
40. Some international legal scholars, such as Ian Brownlie, argue that Article 51 only allows
a state to act in self-defense after a transborder attack has taken place. International lawyers
adopting that view fear that if the self-defense doctrine were expanded, it would be impossible to
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international legal experts interpret the article's reference to the "inherent"
right of self-defense and lack of explicit language abrogating the
customary understanding of that right as leaving the body of customary
international law concerning state self-defense intact.4' As the Charter does
not contain any express language pertaining to a state's right to take
reasonable anticipatory action in self-defense, the maintenance of this
body of customary law is particularly important.42
Modern customary international law concerning the use of force in
anticipatory self-defense developed out of the Carolineincident.43 In 1837,
insurgents contesting British rule in Canada were using the Caroline,a
small steamer, to cross the Niagara River and secure men and supplies
from the United States." A British force entered U.S. territory, stormed the
steamer, set it ablaze, and sent it over the Niagara Falls.45 In the course of
events, the force killed one American citizen and injured several others.46
The British government defended the attack on self-defense grounds.47 The
then U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, responded by insisting that
the scope of state self-defense be confined to circumstances in which its
"necessity... is instant, overwhelming, and leave[s] no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation," that it include "nothing unreasonable or
excessive," and that it "be limited by . . . necessity ... and kept clearly
within it." '48 Webster's pronouncement contains the elements a state must
meet in order to use force in anticipatory self-defense under customary
international law; the anticipated attack must be imminent and the
response to it must be necessary and proportionate.49 It should be noted
that the customary law requirements of necessity and proportionality also
apply to Article 51 self-defense actions undertaken in response to
completed or ongoing-armed attacks.5"
determine whether states resorted to force in self-defense honestly. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275-80 (1963).

41. Schachter, supra note 27, at 1633-35; Sofaer supra note 2, at 16.
42. Schachter, supra note 27, at 1633-35.
43. See Yoo, supra note 2, at 740-41.
44. The Caroline,2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW412 (1906), cited in DAMROSCH

ET AL., supranote 23, at 922.
45. DAMROSCH ET AL., supranote 23, at 922.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 922-23.
49. See id. at 923; Yoo, supra note 2, at 741. Under the international law doctrine of state
self-defense, an evaluation of imminence should include consideration of temporal proximity and
of the probability that the threat will occur. See generally Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary
v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25, 1997).
50. See Schachter, supra note 27, at 1635-38; Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual
WaldemarA. SolfLecture in InternationalLaw:Terrorism,the Law, andthe NationalDefense,126
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The 1986 International Court of Justice (ICJ) case, Military and
ParamilitaryActivities in and againstNicaragua(hereinafter Nicaragua
v. United States), effectively attached one refinement to the international
self-defense regime and highlighted another already in existence at that
time;5" both refinements have received added significance due to the
immense threat that international terrorism poses today.5" The ICJ
considered whether Nicaragua had carried out an armed attack against El
Salvador.53 The United States claimed that Nicaragua's "armed attack"
consisted of providing arms and other logistical support to rebels
attempting to overthrow the Salvadorian government and that it was
therefore entitled to respond with force in collective self-defense.54 The
Court rejected the U.S. argument, holding that "while the concept of an
armed attack includes the d[i]spatch by one State of armed bands into the
territory of another State, the supply of arms and other support to such
bands cannot be equated with armed attack."55 Thus, Nicaraguarefined the
use of force rules concerning self-defense by excluding from the definition
of "armed attack" the provision of weapons and other support.56
Nicaraguav. United States further refined international self-defense
rules by refocusing the issue of responsibility.57 Under customary
international law, states exercising their right of self-defense must be able
to provide adequate proof of responsibility.58 Ordinarily, this is a not a
problem because most states openly use their own forces against one
another.59 However, when a state provides support to non-state actors in
their application of force, the issue of responsibility is raised.6" In
Nicaragua, the ICJ determined whether U.S. assistance to the contras,
counterrevolutionaries seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government,
was of such an extent as to make the United States responsible for their
actions.6" The Court found that U.S. aid to the contras was significant, that
it included military training, arms, and tactical assistance, but concluded
that those forms of support were insufficient to hold the United States
MIL.L. REV. 89,96-98 (1989).
51. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (Judgment on the Merits).
52. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 542-44.
53. Id. at 541-42.
54. Id.
55. Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. at 126-27.
56. Sofaer, supra note 50, at 93-94.
57. Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. at 64-65.
58. Sofaer, supra note 50, at 98.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 61-65; Sofaer, supra note 50, at 101.
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accountable for their actions because they remained autonomous. 62 Most

international legal scholars agree that the ICJ's holdings in Nicaragua
prohibit the state self-defense doctrine, by narrowing the definition of
"armed attack" and by limiting the imputation of responsibility, from
being expanded to legitimate action against states supporting non-state
actors' use of force unless that support rises to the level of active
participation or control.63
Part II presented the international rules governing the use of force in a
manner consistent with the views of most international lawyers. Under the
Charter-based regime, the use of force is prohibited unless the Security
Council authorizes it or it is resorted to in self-defense. The Security
Council can only grant such authorization if international peace and
security is threatened. States may only use force in self-defense to counter
an armed attack that has occurred or that is imminent, they must be able
to demonstrate responsibility for the initial or anticipated attack, and any
response they undertake must be necessary and proportionate.
Il1. THEORIES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Realism provides the predominate explanation of interstate security
relations.' Its principles emerged with Thucydides' History of the
Peloponnesian War, Thomas Hobbes carried them forward, and Hans
Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz have elaborated and refined them in their
efforts to explain modem state behavior.6 ' Realism assumes that the world
is anarchic. 66 That is, that no greater authority exists to govern sovereign
states,67 which are considered to be the primary unitary actors in
international relations.68 The functioning of the United Nations bears this
out; the Security Council may authorize measures to enforce international
rules but it depends on individual states to give them effect. 69 Realists hold
that the power differential among states is the central dynamic of
62. Nicaragua,1986 I.C.J. at 65, 106-10; Sofaer, supranote 50, at 101.
63. See BROWNUE, supra note 40, at 370; Glennon, supranote 2, at 542-44; Sofaer, supra
note 50, at 94, 101.
64. Levy, supra note 18, at 145; CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR: ARGUMENTS ON CAUSES
OF WAR AND PEACE 51 (Richard K. Betts ed., 2d ed. 2005).
65. Joseph P. Nye, Old Wars and Future Wars: Causationand Prevention, in THE ORIGIN
AND PREVENTION OF MAJOR WARS 3, 6-7 (Robert I. Rotberg et al. eds., 1989).
66. John J. Mearsheimer, The FalsePromiseoflnternationalInstitutions, 19 INT'L SECURITY
5, 10 (Winter 1994/95).
67. Id.
68. Levy, supra note 18, at 145.
69. See U.N. Charter art. 43, para. 1.
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international relations.7" They maintain that anarchy leads states to aim to
maximize their relative power position over other states in an effort to
further their security and ensure their survival, 7' and that states' political
leaders base their decisions on rational cost-benefit calculations in order
to advance that aim.72 A key debate within realism concerns hegemony.7
Some international relations scholars insist that a state can maintain a
hegemonic position for some time, so long as it takes steps to minimize the
threat that its power poses, because other states will appreciate its unique
ability to provide stability to the international system.74 Others argue that
hegemony is especially fleeting because states cannot help but fear a
hegemon and will quickly align to balance against one.75
Foreign policy theories can be developed from realism's core principles
and its debate concerning hegemony.76 These foreign policy theories, or
strategies, define and prioritize a state's interests and thereby specify under
what circumstances it should resort to force. Three such strategies have
been formulated to guide American foreign policy in the current
international environment-balance-of-threat preponderance, balancer of
last resort, and selective engagement. Each is presented in turn in the subsections that follow.
A. Preponderance
The balance-of-threat preponderance strategy supposes that states
weigh the intentions of other states and not just their capabilities when
deciding whether to balance against them.77 It also assumes that
hegemonic status is beneficial because it minimizes security threats and
maximizes foreign policy maneuverability.78 Those points considered, the
strategy insists that the United States can and should seek to prolong its
current hegemonic position.79 To do so, it suggests that American policies
aim at dissuading other states, either singly or collectively, from balancing
against the United States.80 The preponderance strategy thus instructs the
70. Robert Gilpin, The Theory of Hegemonic War, in THE ORIGIN AND PREVENTION OF
MAJOR WARS 15, 15 (Robert I. Rotberg et al. eds., 1989).
71. Mearsheimer, supra note 66, at 11.
72. Gilpin, supra note 70, at 36.
73. Levy, supra note 18, at 146-47.
74. See id. at 148; Stephen M. Walt, Alliance Formationand the Balanceof WorldPower,
9 INT'L SECURITY 3, 13-14, 37, 39-40 (1995).
75. Id.
76. See KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 121-22 (1979).

77.
78.
79.
80.

See Mastanduno, supranote 19, at 60.
See Mearsheimer, supra note 66, at 11-12.
See Mastanduno, supranote 19, at 60, 63.
Id. at 60.
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United States to maintain international stability and to limit the threat its
power presents to others by emphasizing multilateralism. 8
82
Stability is crucial because it permits and fosters interdependence.
The preponderance strategy adopts the logic of commercial liberalism,
which holds that growing economic welfare requires increasing levels of
stability.83 According to commercial liberalism, economic prosperity and
stability form a symbiotic relationship that, as economic interdependence
deepens and spreads, creates stakes for states in stability, and eventually
leads to international peace.84 While stability disproportionately benefits
the United States and other states with advanced economic interests, it can
be considered a global public good in the sense that every state can enjoy
its benefits, even those that do not contribute to its maintenance, without
diminishing its availability to others.85 The preponderance strategy
maintains that so long as the United States supplies stability, a good that
its unique hegemonic position86allows it to provide, other states will be less
inclined to contest its power.
The strategy identifies Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf as
regions in which the United States has vital security interests; these three
regions represent core U.S. geographical concerns.87 Europe and East Asia
are important because they are the regions from which a potential
challenger to U.S. hegemony could emerge and because they are central
to the proper functioning of the interdependent world economy. 88 The
Persian Gulf is important because of its energy resources. 89 The
preponderance strategy also forces the United States to concern itself with
peripheral states, those outside of Europe, East Asia, and the Persian
Gulf.9 ° America must guard against the possibility that instability in the
periphery will negatively affect its position vis-A-vis the core.9 Threats
from peripheral instability could give cause to powers in the core to
develop their own advanced military capabilities, eventually leading them
81. Id. at 63; Christopher Layne, From Preponderanceto Offshore Balancing,in THE USE
OF FORCE: MILITARY POWER AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 283,285 (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 6th

ed. 2004). I use the term "balancer of last resort" in place of Layne's term "offshore balancer."
82. See Layne, supra note 81, at 286-87.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Joseph S. Nye, The American National Interest and Global Public Goods, 2 INT'L AFF.
239-40 (2002).
86. Id. at 241; Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 61.
87. Layne, supra note 81, at 285.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 286.
91. Id.
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to challenge U.S. military dominance, or they could undercut U.S.
prosperity by disrupting global economic interdependence. 92
The balance-of-threat preponderance strategy advises the United States
to accommodate and reassure status quo states, those states presently
content with existing within an American-led international system, in the
core and periphery. 93 Specifically, the United States should avoid behavior
that status quo states would perceive as threatening, help deter and
confront threats to the security of status quo states, and provide
opportunities for status quo states to demonstrate their power and enhance
their prestige without challenging the U.S. international order. 94 The
strategy also recommends that the United States contain and confront
revisionist states, those states that seek to alter the current U.S.-led world
system, in the core and periphery. 95 Particularly, the United States should
organize diplomatic and military coalitions against revisionist states.96
Whether dealing with status quo or revisionist states, the preponderance
strategy stresses that it is in the United States' best interest to utilize
multilateral processes. Acting multilaterally and making use of institutions
such as the United Nations allows status quo states to temper U.S.
behavior they find threatening, lessening the likelihood of discontent
among them, and creates power and prestige outlets. 97
B. Balancer
The balancer of last resort strategy is a more traditional balance-ofpower strategy. Contrary to the preponderance strategy, it presumes that
states weigh only capabilities when deciding whether to balance against
other states. 98 The balancer strategy insists that states will promptly move
to balance American hegemony, despite any effort on the part of the
United States to ensure international stability or limit the threat its power
poses to others, if they have not done so already.99 According to this
strategy, even if it were assumed, hypothetically, that states are not quick
to balance against a hegemon, it would be detrimental for the United States
to dedicate its resources to providing international stability and an
environment conducive to economic interdependence.' 00 Far from
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See Layne, supra note 81, at 286; Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 68.
Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 61-62.
See Levy, supra note 18, at 146-47.
Id.
See Layne, supra note 81, at 287.
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prolonging U.S. hegemony, the balancer strategy contends that such farreaching objectives will actually hasten America's decline." ° '
The balancer of last resort strategy takes the position that U.S.
commitments required to maintain international stability and the costs
associated with them are ever expanding, and will lead to U.S.
overextension. 0 2 It maintains that America does not benefit from the
stability that it provides as much as other states do.0 3 The strategy argues
that, by subsidizing the rest of the world's security, the United States is
actually squandering its resources and assisting other states to challenge
its own preeminence.""° It advises, instead, that America allow other states
to bear the burden of defending their interests themselves.0 5 The balancer
strategy also discounts the benefits of economic interdependence.' 6 It
stresses that relative economic power matters because it is the foundation
of military power and that interdependence accelerates the redistribution
of relative economic power in a manner counter to U.S. interests.'0 7 Based
on that view and because of the size and diversified nature of the U.S.
economy, the strategy holds that the United States can and should develop
an insular, neomercantilist economic approach.'0°
The balancer strategy identifies only two vital U.S. interests: defending
American territorial integrity and preventing the rise of a Eurasian
hegemon.' °9 It also contends that the United States is in a position to adopt
the policies of a great insular power because it faces no proximate
geographic rival and has formidable military and economic capabilities."l°
The strategy therefore counsels America to disengage from its military
commitments in Europe and East Asia and eschew participation in
attempts to save "failed states" and humanitarian interventions."'
It further recommends that the United States maximize its freedom to
act by withdrawing from its permanent alliances and multilateral
involvements." 12 According to the balancer strategy, if America adopted
an insular power approach, security competitions would break out in
Europe and East Asia, necessarily strengthening the relative power
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 291-92.
See id.
Layne, supranote 81, at 294.
See id. at 291, 293.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 293-94.
Id. at292.
Layne, supra note 81, at 295.
Id. at 292-93.
See id. at 295.
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position of the United States." 3 The strategy supposes that Eurasian states
will instinctively act to prevent the emergence of a hegemon in their
immediate proximities and that U.S. strength and geography is likely to
deter threats to its actual territorial boundaries." 4 It maintains that the
United States should seek to maximize its relative power position by
marshalling its resources and inhibiting the redistribution of economic
power so that it is prepared to act as the balancer of last resort in the event
that other, more proximate, states cannot adequately constrain a rising
Eurasian power. 1"'

C. Selective Engagement
The strategy of selective engagement accepts that international stability
benefits the United States and that American leadership is essential to
maintaining it. Selective engagement steers the middle course between
what it sees as the overly expansive commitments of the preponderance
strategy and the overly restrictive isolationism of the balancer strategy." 6
It hedges its bet somewhere in between the balance-of-threat and balanceof-power positions the other two strategies take, and attempts to strike a
balance between doing too much and doing too little. "7 It therefore
explicitly distinguishes between vital and desirable U.S. interests; the
former warrant direct military action, the latter do not." 8 This strategy is
proactive. Where possible, "it seeks to prevent circumstances adverse to
the United States from arising, rather than reacting to them once they have
occurred;" the strategy considers this preventative course more effective
and cost-efficient. 9 Selective engagement counsels America to retain its
permanent alliances and military commitments in core regions.' It also
prefers that the United States defend its interests by forming "coalitions of
the willing" with other states, but recognizes that America may have to act
alone. 2 '
The selective engagement strategy identifies three U.S. vital interests:
homeland security, Eurasian great-power peace, and assured access to

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 296-97
Id. at 295-96
See Layne, supranote 81, at 296-97.
Robert J. Art, The Strategy of Selective Engagement, in THE USE OF FORCE: MILrrARY
POWER AND INTERNATIONAL POLTICS 299, 300 (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 6th ed. 2004).
117. See id.
118. Seeid.at302,313.
119. Id. at301.
120. Id. at 302.
121. Art, supranote 116, at 302.
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Persian Gulf oil. 22
' Homeland security is the interest upon which all others
depend. The strategy considers it unlikely that Eurasian nuclear and
conventional powers will act against the United States, and concerns itself
primarily with the threat terrorists and rogue states pose. 23 It insists that
America must limit the ability of terrorists and rogue states to acquire
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and sanctions the preventive use of
force in order to do that. 124 Selective engagement argues that preserving
peace among the great Eurasian powers is vital because war between them
carries the risk of involving the United States and disrupting vast U.S.
stakes in the global economy.' 25 The strategy also maintains that securing
a supply of oil at stable prices is crucial to the functioning of the U.S. and
world economies, and that assured access to Persian Gulf oil is necessary
to secure such a supply. 26 It holds that states threatening to dominate or
disrupt the
availability of the world's most vital raw material must be
27
1
stopped.
Selective engagement also identifies international economic openness,
democracy spread, and human rights protection as desirable U.S.
interests. 28 Like the preponderance strategy, 29 selective engagement
adopts the logic of commercial liberalism. 3 ° It thus contends that
international economic openness benefits the United States by allowing it
to allocate its resources most favorably and by increasing the tendencies
of states toward stability and democracy. 3 ' The strategy insists that the
spread of democracy is beneficial because democratic states are more
peaceful than non-democratic states and because the peace that democracy
engenders promotes global economic growth. 3 2 It considers human rights
protection important because it encompasses values that most Americans
hold dear and because states that do elevate the status of human rights tend
to function as or transition to strong economies and democracies.' 33 The
selective engagement strategy generally counsels the United States not to
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 303-10.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 307-08.
Robert J. Art, A Defensible Defense: America's GrandStrategy After the Cold War, in
THE USE OF FORCE: MILITARY POWER AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 477, 507 (Robert J. Art et al.
eds., 4th ed. 1993); Art, supra note 116, at 309-10.
127. Art, supra note 126, at 507.
128. See Art, supra note 116, at 310-12.
129. Layne, supra note 81, at 286.
130. See Art, supra note 116, at 311.
131. See Layne, supranote 81, at 286-87.
132. Art, supra note 116, at 311.
133. Id. at 312.
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use military force to advance its desirable interests. 134 It does put forth one
exception however, to prevent genocide-like mass murder in states where
outside military intervention is feasible and against whom America can
form coalitions of the willing.'35
Part III introduced the international relations theory of realism and
three American foreign policy strategies derived from it. Actual U.S.
foreign policy in recent years has reflected the preponderance, balancer,
and selective engagement strategies, either in isolation from or in
combination with one another, at different times and to varying degrees.
The balance-of-threat preponderance strategy considers international
stability a predominate U.S. interest and advises the United States to act,
multilaterally, to reassure status quo states and confront revisionist ones.
The balancer of last resort strategy defines prevailing U.S. interests as
defending American territorial integrity and preventing the rise of a
Eurasian hegemon. It urges the United States to pull back from expensive
overseas commitments, leave other states to defend their own interests, and
maximize America's relative power position so that it retains the ability to
step into Europe or East Asia as the balancer of last resort. The selective
engagement strategy strikes a balance between the preponderance and
balancer strategies. It maintains that the United States should be prepared
to use force only to protect its vital interests. Selective engagement
identifies homeland security, Eurasian great-power peace, and access to
Persian Gulf oil as America's vital interests.
IV. CASE

STUDIES

Examining America's use of military force in Gulf War I, Somalia,
Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Gulf War II demonstrates the significant divide
that exists between actual state behavior and the international rules
governing the use of force. It also provides a means for evaluating how
consistent actual U.S. state practice is with the preponderance, balancer,
and selective engagement strategies and how effective they are as a means
of predicting future American military involvement. Moreover, such an
examination yields important insights into the relationship between how
states actually perceive and pursue their interests and the overarching U.N.
Charter goals of international peace and security. The U.S. decisions to use
force in Gulf War I, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Gulf War H are
explored in terms of their consistency with the international use of force
regime, as most international legal scholars interpret it, and the balance-of134. Id. at 313-14.
135. Id.at 314.
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threat preponderance, balancer of last resort, and selective engagement
strategies below.
A. Gulf War I
Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.136 Rather than repaying
billions of dollars borrowed from Kuwait during the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi
dictator Saddam Hussein, using old territorial claims to rationalize his
actions, invaded and attempted to annex Kuwait.'37 On August 3, 1990, the
U.N. Security Council, with Resolution 660, unanimously condemned the
invasion and insisted that Iraq withdraw all of its armed forces from
Kuwait "immediately and unconditionally."' 38 On August 6, 1990, the
Security Council, using its Article 41 powers, passed Resolution 661
requiring economic sanctions against Iraq. 3 9 Those sanctions ultimately
proved insufficient and, on November 29, 1990, the Security Council,
relying on Article 42, adopted Resolution 678 authorizing the use of force
to eject Iraq from Kuwait. 4 ° The resolution gave Iraq until January 15,
1991 to withdraw from Kuwait, after which time it authorized U.N.
Member-States to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement
resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area.' 14' This was only the second
time in its history, the first being the Korean War, that the Security
force in response to a
Council had authorized
42 the use of collective
transboundary attack. 1
Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by the January 15 deadline and,
with Security Council approval clearly ensuring the legality of force, the
United States began Operation Desert Storm with an immense
bombardment of Iraq and Iraqi positions in Kuwait on January 16, 1991.143
The United States led and provided most of the strength to an international
coalition, which included Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom,
France, Argentina, and Canada, that successfully liberated Kuwait on
February 27, 1991.'44 On April 6, 1991, pursuant to Security Council
136. PATERSON ET AL., supranote 20, at 488.
137. Id.
138. S.C. Res. 660 (Aug. 3, 1990). For a general, chronological discussion of U.N. Security
Council actions concerning Gulf War I, see John C. Yoo, InternationalLaw and the War in Iraq,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 564 (2003).
139. S.C. Res. 661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
140. See S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
141. Id.
142. DAMROSCH ETAL., supra note 23, at 1010-11.
143. PATERSON ET AL., supranote 20, at 490.
144. DAMROSCH ETAL.,supra note 23, at 1014; Yoo, supra note 138, at 564.
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terms of a cease-fire between
Resolution 687, Iraq formally accepted the
4
itself, Kuwait, and the U.S.-led coalition. 1
The balance-of-threat preponderance strategy would have supported the
U.S. decision to use force in Gulf War I. The preponderance strategy
it
considers the Persian Gulf a core American geographic interest; thus, 46
automatically considers instability there a threat to the United States.1
U.S. participation in Operation Desert Storm was also consistent with the
strategy's emphasis on reassuring core status quo states and confronting
revisionist ones.147 Eurasian powers were and are highly dependent on
Persian Gulf oil and, therefore, would have likely countered Iraq without
U.S. assistance in order to maintain access to it. 148 The fact that Iraq also
threatened to move against Saudi Arabia, which, with approximately
twenty-five percent of the world's proven oil reserves, was and is the
world's leading oil producer and exporter, furthered that possibility. 49 So
then, beyond what the deleterious effects on the interdependent global
economy rising oil prices, resulting from instability in the Persian Gulf,
would have caused, U.S. inaction may have led other states to build up
their military capacities in an effort to stabilize the Gulf, a prospect
counter to American interests, as the preponderance strategy defines
them. 5' Also in accord with the preponderance strategy, U.S. action in
Gulf War I was pursued multilaterally. 5 ' The multilateral character of
Operation Desert Storm, which its U.N. mandate enhanced, lessened the
threat U.S. military superiority conveyed and provided an outlet for several
core status quo states to display their power and enhance5 2their prestige
without impacting the American-led international system.
U.S. military action in Gulf War I ran counter to the balancer of last
resort strategy. 153 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its possible invasion
of Saudi Arabia did not threaten U.S. territorial boundaries or seem likely
to precipitate the rise of a Eurasian hegemon.'54 The balancer strategy,
therefore, would have counseled the United States not to involve itself in
145. Yoo, supranote 138, at 564.
146. See Layne, supranote 81, at 285.
147. See Mastanduno, supranote 19, at 62.
148. See Art, supranote 116, at 310.
149. See id.; PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 489; Energy Information Administration,
Saudi Arabia Country Analysis Brief 3 (2005), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
saudi.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
150. See Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 66-69.
151.

See PATERSON ET AL., supranote 20, at 488-89.

152. See Mastanduno, supranote 19, at 62; Stephen M. Walt, Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping
US. ForeignPolicy, INT'L SECURITY, Winter 2001/02, at 60, 76.
153. See Layne, supra note 81, at 292-93.
154. See PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 488-92.
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the situation.'55 Because this strategy stresses the importance of retaining
U.S. freedom to act and necessarily favors unilateralism over
multilateralism, the fact that Gulf War I was a multi-state, U.N. effort
meant little. 5 6 The balancer strategy's focus on achieving a maximum
relative power position also would have advised the United States to
refrain from involving itself in the conflict.'57 Because America received
the majority of its oil from sources in the Western Hemisphere, any
disruption in the supply and price of Persian Gulf oil would have
disproportionately affected Eurasian states, which were particularly
dependent on it.'58 The negative economic impact associated with Eurasian
states' impeded access to oil and the additional resources U.S. nonparticipation in Gulf War I would have forced them to expend would have
elevated the American relative power position vis-A-vis the Eurasian states
that took part in the operation.'59
The selective engagement strategy would have countenanced the U.S.
use of force in Operation Desert Storm. 60 Selective engagement identifies
assured access to Persian Gulf oil as a vital American interest and, thus,
allows the United States to use force to defend it. 6 ' The strategy also
sanctions the use of force to thwart states threatening to grab control of the
Gulfs oil.' 62 Iraq's posture towards Saudi Arabia after its invasion of
Kuwait certainly fit that description. 63 Moreover, Gulf War I aligned the
United States with a coalition of the willing, a condition that the selective
engagement strategy considers even more of a reason to support military
action when a vital interest is at stake.164
The U.S. decision to resort to force in Gulf War I was legal under
international law. The United States and its alliance partners acted in
accordance with U.N. Security Council authorization. Operation Desert
Storm was also consistent with the preponderance strategy's emphasis on
maintaining core stability, reassuring status quo states, and acting
multilaterally. American participation in Gulf War I conflicted, however,
with the balancer of last resort strategy's focus on U.S. territorial integrity
and maximizing American relative power. Finally, the U.S. use of force in
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Layne, supranote 81, at 292-93.
See id. at 295.
See id. at 296-97.
See Art, supra note 116, at 310.
See Layne, supranote 81, at 285; Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 68.
See Art, supra note 116, at 307-10.
See id. at 309; Art, supranote 126, at 507.
Art, supra note 126, at 507.

163. See PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 488-89.

164. See Art, supra note 116, at 302.
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Gulf War I did comply with the selective engagement strategy, which
identifies secure access to Persian Gulf oil as a vital American interest.
B. Somalia
In 1991, the collapse of nearly all of Somalia's state structures and
intense fighting between rival factions vying for control of the country
interfered with U.N. relief efforts and left the civilian Somali population
under severe threat of starvation.'65 By January 1992,300,000 Somalis had
died from malnutrition, more than 3,000 were dying daily from starvation,
and more than 500,000 had fled to neighboring states. 6 6 The U.N.
Secretary-General urged the Security Council to take action under Article
39 in order to bring violence against the international relief effort to an
end.'6 7 On December 3, 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution
794, authorizing Member-States "to use all necessary means to establish
as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian operations in
Somalia."' 68
The United States responded by landing 1,300 Marines in the Somali
capital, Mogadishu, on December 9, 1992.169 Within weeks, the U.S. troop
presence there rose to 28,150.170 Operation Restore Hope initially
succeeded.'7'
U.S. military officials formed cooperative relations with the most
powerful Somali warlord, Mohamed Farah Aidid, allowing food deliveries
and medication efforts to progress.'72 This early success led the United
Nations to expand its mission on March 26, 1993, with Security Council
Resolution 814, to include the "re-establishment of national and regional
institutions and civil administration" and the "restoration and maintenance
of peace, stability, and law and order" in Somalia.'73 The warring Somali
factions did not accept this intrusion into Somali politics, however, and the
relations between them and the United States and United Nations quickly
soured. 7' 4
165. Jon Western, Sources ofHumanitarianIntervention:Beliefs, Information,andAdvocacy
in the US. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia, INT'L SECURITY, Spring 2002, at 122.
166. Id.
167. DAMROSCH ET AL., supranote 23, at 1032.
168. S.C. Res. 794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
169. Western, supra note 165, at 112.
170. PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 478.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. S.C. Res. 814 (Mar. 26, 1993).
174. ANDREW J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S.
DIPLOMACY 144 (2002).
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On June 5, 1993, Aidid militiamen killed twenty-four Pakistani
peacekeepers serving under U.N. command.' 75 In reaction, the Security
Council passed Resolution 837 calling for the "arrest and detention for
prosecution, trial and punishment" of those responsible for the attack.'7 6
It was in an action undertaken pursuant to this resolution, on October 3,
1993, that eighteen U.S. Army Rangers were killed.'77 Their deaths and the
political fallout that resulted from them led the United States to withdraw
all of its remaining troops from Somalia by April 1994.178
The preponderance strategy would not have sanctioned the American
use of force in Operation Restore Hope. 7 9 Somalia lays outside of core
U.S. geographic interests and the terrible humanitarian situation that
persisted there in the early 1990s did not threaten to spillover into them;
the Somali crisis was unlikely to cause any Eurasian power to build up its
military strength substantially or disrupt the world economy.180 Moreover,
the instability in Somalia did not threaten the status quo, peripheral states
that lay in actual proximity to it in any significant way.' 81 Furthermore,
while Somalia was certainly a failed state, it was not a revisionist state
seeking to alter the U.S.-led international system. 82 Because U.N.
attention ensured a multilateral effort to ameliorate the situation in
Somalia, the crisis provided an opportunity for core states to demonstrate
their power and build their prestige.'83 While the preponderance strategy
recommends that the United States support such multilateral undertakings,
and prestige outlets alone does not warrant the American
providing power
84
force.1
of
use
The balancer of last resort strategy, like the balance-of-threat
preponderance strategy, would not have supported the American decision
to employ force in Somalia. 185 The Somali crisis did not threaten U.S.
territorial integrity or the emergence of a Eurasian hegemon.186 Further, the
175. PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 480.

176. S.C. Res. 837 (June 6, 1993).
177. DAMROSCH ETAL.,supra note 23, at 1034.
178. Id.

179. See Layne, supra note 81, at 285.
180. See PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 478-80; Layne, supra note 81, at 285;

Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 66-69.
181. See PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 478-80; Western, supra note 165, at 122.
182. Western, supra note 165, at 122-23; Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 62, 68-69; HANS J.
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 43-76 (1978)

(defining
183.
184.
185.
186.

revisionist and status quo states).
See PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 478-80; Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 61-62.
See Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 61-63.
See Layne, supra note 81, at 292.
See id.; PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 478-80; Western, supranote 165, at 122.
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balancer strategy expressly counsels the United States to avoid accruing
the costs associated with attempts to save failed states and humanitarian
interventions. 87 As with Gulf War I, the fact that the effort in Somalia was
multilateral and organized under the auspices of the United Nations should
not have made, according to the balancer strategy, the argument that the
United States should militarily intervene there anymore compelling. 188 The
89
strategy also emphasizes the importance of relative power gains.

Precisely because the possibility of the Somali situation affecting security
in the American homeland was so remote, the balancer strategy would
have preferred the United States to bolster its relative power position by
allowing other states to expend their resources addressing the Somali
ordeal, rather than by intervening as it did.' 9°
The U.S. military involvement in Somalia diverged from the strategy
of selective engagement.' 9' The Somali crisis did not implicate any of
America's vital interests.' 92 It did not threaten homeland security, Eurasian
great-power peace, or access to Persian Gulf oil.'9 3 The selective
engagement strategy defines the ostensible objectives of the U.S. action
undertaken in Somalia, preventing humanitarian disasters and promoting
democracy, as desirable American interests. 94 According to that strategy,
however, the United States should only use force to protect its vital
interests, not to advance its desirable ones. 195 The selective engagement
strategy does identify an exception to that position; it maintains that the
196
United States should use force to prevent genocide-like mass197murder.
While tragic, the crisis in Somalia did not meet that standard.
The American use of force in Operation Restore Hope was legal under
international law. Security Council Resolutions 794, 814, and 837
authorized the range of U.S. military actions undertaken in Somalia. The
U.S. decision to use force in Somalia, though, departed from the
preponderance, balancer of last resort, and selective engagement strategies.
Under preponderance, the United States should not have intervened in
Somalia because instability there did not threaten to spill over into the
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
at 122.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Layne, supra note 81, at 292.
Seeid. at295.
Id. at 293, 296.
See id. at 296-97.
See Art, supra note 116, at 302-14.
See id. at 302-10; PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 478-80; Western, supranote 165,
See supra note 192.
Art, supra note 116, at 311-12.
Id.at 303, 313.
Id. at 314.
BACEVICH, supra note 174, at 143-47; Western, supranote 165, at 122.
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core. If it had followed the balancer strategy, America would have sought
to maximize its relative power position by steering clear of military action
in Somalia. Had the United States been true to selective engagement, it
would not have used force in Somalia because the situation there did not
threaten any of its vital interests or amount to genocide-like mass murder.
C. Kosovo
Kosovo was an autonomous region in the former Yugoslavia, which
both ethnic Albanians and Serbs inhabited.' 98 The collapse ofYugoslavia's
communist structure in the late 1980s ushered in an era of rising ethnic
tensions, revocation of Kosovo's independent status, and increasing
Serbian discrimination against Kosovar Albanians.'99 As ethnic violence
broke out in various parts of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s,
Kosovar Albanians became subject to more repression.200 An agreement
the United States brokered in 1995 largely lessened the conflicts between
Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, but the plight of Kosovo's Albanians
continued to worsen.20 '
In 1998, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) cracked down on
Kosovar Albanians, killing dozens and leading more than 230,000 to flee
their villages. 20 2 A NATO-led effort to reach a negotiated political
settlement between Kosovar Albanians and the Serbian government failed
in February 1999.203 In March of that year, Serbian forces began an
expansive effort to drive ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo. 204 Most
Albanians fled, Serbian troops killed or detained many that remained.20 5
In response, on March 24, 1999, the United States and several of its NATO
allies initiated Operation Allied Force, a massive bombing campaign
against Serbia aimed at preventing further attacks against Kosovar
Albanians.20 6 The United States offered no legal justification for its actions
but claimed that the air operation was necessary to protect Kosovo's
Albanians and prevent the conflict from spreading to the rest of Europe.20 7
The U.S. aerial attacks ended on June 10, 1999 with an agreement by the
Serbian government to withdraw its troops from Kosovo, permit the return
198. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 23, at 998; PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 477.
199. PATERSON ET AL., supranote 20, at 477.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Yoo, supranote 26, at 1679.
Id.
DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 23, at 998; PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 477.
Sofaer, supranote 2, at 2-3; Yoo, supra note 26, at 1679-80.
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of Albanian refugees to the region, and grant greater autonomy to the
Kosovar province."'
Under the current international use of force rules, as the international
legal academy generally understands them, the U.S. involvement in
Operation Allied Force was illegal."0 9 There is no general exception to
Article 2(4)'s prohibition of the use of force for humanitarian
intervention. 2" Therefore, the United States needed to have had Security
Council authorization prior to engaging in military action or have been
acting in self-defense.211 While the Security Council did find that the
condition in Kosovo constituted a "threat to peace and security in the
region," it stopped short of authorizing the use of force under Articles 39
and 42.212 With respect to self-defense, the United States and its NATO
partners could not have satisfied the armed attack criterion of Article 51
and would have had difficulty claiming, plausibly,213that the situation in
Kosovo posed an imminent threat to their security.
The balance-of-threat preponderance strategy would have concurred
with the U.S. decision to use military force in Kosovo.2" 4 The situation in
Kosovo threatened to spillover and impact core, status quo European
states.215 The preponderance strategy takes a negative view of such
"creeping instability., 21 6 Instability originating in Kosovo could have
provided the impetus for European states to advance their military
capabilities to an extent detrimental to the United States and disrupted the
international economy. 2 7 The preponderance strategy also stresses that the
208. Yoo, supranote 26, at 1682; S.C. Press Release 6686 (June 10, 1999).
209. Sofaer, supra note 2, at 1-3; Yoo, supra note 26, at 1725-26. For an alternative view
suggesting that the U.S. action in Kosovo was legal see Sofaer, supra note 2, at 12-16. He argues
that under the "common-lawyer" approach to the international use of force rules, an approach that
weighs all of the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding a decision to use force, Operation
Allied Force was appropriate.
210. SCHACHTER, supra note 30, at 123-25. For arguments asserting that there is or should be
a general exception to the prohibition of the use of force for humanitarian intervention, see
generally Bruce W. Jentleson, Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy
in the Post-Cold War Era (2000); see also Richard B. Lillich, HumanitarianIntervention:A Reply
to Dr.Brownlie and a Pleafor ConstructiveAlternatives, in LAW AND CIVuL WAR INTHE MODERN

WORLD 229, 247-48 (Moore, ed. 1974); Wil D. Verwey, Humanitarian Intervention Under
InternationalLaw, 32 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 357, 371 (1985).

211. Schachter, supra note 27, at 1625.
212. S.C. Res. 1199 (Sept. 23, 1998).
213. See Sofaer, supranote 2, at 1-3; Yoo, supra note 26, at 1725-26; U.N. Charter art. 51;
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 125-26.
214. See Layne, supra note 81, at 285; Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 62.
215. BACEVICH, supra note 174, at 104-06; Yoo, supra note 26, at 1679-80.
216. BACEVICH, supra note 174, at 104-06; Layne, supra note 81, at 285.
217. See Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 68.
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Untied States should take steps to reassure status quo states, including
confronting potential threats to their security.218 The U.S. use of force in
Kosovo was in line with that objective. 2 9 Furthermore, the preponderance
strategy recommends that the United States make use of multilateral
processes. 220 Operation Allied Force did just that.22' It was a joint-NATO
endeavor and, as such, supplied an outlet for core European states to
exhibit power and garner prestige,
while lessening the threat America's
222
conveyed.
force
of
display
The balancer strategy would have advised the United States not to use
force in Kosovo.223 The Kosovo crisis did not threaten U.S. territorial
boundaries and was not likely to lead to the rise of a Eurasian hegemon.224
This strategy also explicitly states that America should not partake in
humanitarian interventions. 225 From a pure balance-of-power stand point
it is better to let other states absorb those types of costs. 226 Moreover, the
balancer strategy maintains that relative power gains are crucial. 227 Had the
United States followed the balancer approach, it would have recognized
that any commitment of resources European states made to deal with the
instability in Kosovo was in its benefit. 228 At the minimum, leaving
European core states to sort out the situation in Kosovo would have
diverted a greater amount of their resources away from more economically
advantageous areas and, at the extreme, could have led to an arms race
between them.229
Like the preponderance strategy, selective engagement, although
somewhat hesitantly, would have also sanctioned the U.S. use of force in
Kosovo. 2 0 The selective engagement strategy is reluctant to counsel the
United States to resort to force in peripheral areas such as the former
Yugoslavia. 23' However, if America calculates that instability in the
periphery threatens its vital interests, the selective engagement strategy's
dedication to protecting vital U.S. interests and emphasis on acting
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
See BACEVICH, supra note 174, at 104-06; PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 475-77.
See Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 68, 72; Walt, supra note 152, at 60, 76.
PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 475-77.
Id.; Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 68.
See Layne, supra note 81, at 292-94.
See PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 477; Mastanduno, supranote 19, at 66-69.
Layne, supra note 81, at 292.
See id. at 292, 296.
Id. at 293, 296
See id.
See id. at 295-97.
See Art, supra note 116, at 307-08, 311-12.
See id. at 313-14; Western, supra note 165, at 117.
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preemptively would support U.S. military action.232 Comments by U.S.
leaders make clear that they believed that the situation in Kosovo
threatened peace in Europe more generally. 233 Thus, the U.S. decision to
undertake military action in Operation Allied Force was consistent with
selective engagement.234 Many observers grouped Serbian actions against
Kosovo's Albanians together and characterized them as "ethnic
cleansing. ' '235 There is some debate over whether Serb perpetrated ethnic
cleansing amounted to genocide. 236 If it in fact did, the selective
engagement strategy would have also countenanced
America's use of
237
force to prevent genocide from continuing.
The U.S. use of force on behalf of Kosovar Albanians violated the
Charter-based regime governing the use of force, as it is most often
interpreted. The United States did not have prior Security Council
authorization to use force in Kosovo, nor could it plausibly claim that it
acted in individual or collective self-defense. The preponderance strategy
would have supported the U.S. military action in Kosovo, as the situation
there threatened to spread instability across Europe and as it was
undertaken multilaterally. The balancer strategy's stance on humanitarian
interventions and its focus on relative power gains would have led it to
recommend against U.S. involvement in Operation Allied Force. Selective
engagement, though reluctant, would have supported the U.S. decision to
use force; the unstable Kosovar situation threatened broader European
stability.
D. Afghanistan
The United States quickly traced the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. to al Qaeda, a terrorist
network of Islamic extremists led by Osama bin Laden. 238 America next
determined that bin Laden was seeking refuge in Afghanistan, a state from
which he had frequently directed terrorist operations since 1996.239 The
United States presented Afghanistan's Taliban government with an

232. See Art, supra note 116, at 300-03.
233. Yoo, supra note 26, at 1679-80.
234. See Art, supra note 116, at 301-06.
235. PATERSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 475-77.
236. See Yoo, supra note 26, at 1725 (stating that if it could be substantiated that Serbian
activities rose to the level of genocide U.S./NATO action in Kosovo may have been legal; Yoo
argues that genocide is a crime against humanity that any nation is authorized to stop).
237. Art, supra note 116, at 314.
238. Walt, supranote 152, at 56.
239. Id.
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ultimatum to turn over bin Laden. 240 The Taliban refused and, on October
7, 2001, the United States began military efforts to eradicate al Qaeda, bin
Laden, and the Taliban.241 Prior to the beginning of Operation Enduring
Freedom, NATO had invoked its Article 5 collective security guarantee
and many other states had pledged military support to the United States.242
Several other states thus joined the American effort in Afghanistan,
participating at least nominally; they included Australia, Canada, the
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland,
Russia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.243 Operation Enduring Freedom
succeeded in ousting the Taliban from power shortly after it began.
Continuing U.S. military action in Afghanistan is directed at pacifying the
al Qaeda and Taliban elements that remain.
Despite the direct nature of the al Qaeda terrorist attacks against the
United States, most international lawyers consider the broad U.S. use of
force in Afghanistan to have been illegal. 2 " To overcome the U.N.
Charter's general prohibition of the use of force, a state must have prior
Security Council approval to resort to force or be capable of satisfying the
elements of state self-defense. In response to the September 11 attacks, the
Security Council did condemn international terrorism and label it a "threat
[] to international peace and security., 24 5 It also recognized the "inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the
Charter. 246 It did not authorize, however, any use of force.247
The United States claimed that its right to self-defense justified its use
of force in Afghanistan.248 However, under the international legal
establishment's interpretation of the use of force regime, that right
extended to action against al Qaeda, not the Afghani government.249
America did not have, prior to employing force in Operation Enduring
Freedom, sufficient evidence to impute responsibility for the September
11 terrorist attacks to the Taliban. 250 According to Nicaraguav. United
States, such imputation of responsibility requires the demonstration of

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 61.
243. White House, Operation Enduring Freedom: One Year of Accomplishments, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/defense/enduringfreedom.html (Mar. 21, 2004).
244. Glennon, supra note 2, at 542-44; Yoo, supra note 2, at 4, 6.
245. S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Yoo, supra note 2, at 4.
249. See Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 106-10; BROWNLIE, supra note 40, at 370.
250. See Glennon, supra note 2, at 542-44.
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active participation or control.2 5' It is important to note here, forjus ad
bellum purposes, that what matters is what a state reasonably understood
at the time it initiated hostilities, not what it discovered after they
commenced."' Therefore, the evidence that has surfaced since October 7,
2001 suggesting that al Qaeda and the Taliban had a symbiotic relationship
does not factor into thejus ad bellum analysis. 253 Even if the United States
had been able to meet the standard for imputing responsibility to the
Taliban, it is not clear whether it satisfied the other elements of state selfdefense-imminent threat, necessity, and proportionality.2 4 Another
terrorist attack against the United States in the immediate aftermath of the
World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks was not a known certainty.
Moreover, the fact that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan began
approximately one month after the September 11 attacks argues against
their necessity. Finally, the toppling of the Taliban government and the
sheer magnitude of the U.S. force employed in Afghanistan implicates
proportionality.
The American decision to use force in Afghanistan was consistent with
the preponderance strategy. 255 That strategy seeks to prolong U.S.
hegemony; implicit in that concept is the notion that American security
cannot be challenged. 256 Beyond the obvious harms attacks against the
U.S. mainland cause to America's infrastructure and economy, such
attacks can damage U.S. international prestige and, in turn, the U.S.-led
global system. 257 A diminution of American prestige can negatively alter
the perceived strength of U.S. commitments and the ability of the United
States to reassure status quo states and deter revisionist ones.2 58 If
instability in a peripheral state like Afghanistan can affect the hegemon,
the preponderance strategy would also assume it could affect other core
geographic U.S. interest areas. 259 Therefore, in order to prevent further
251. SeeNicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 106-10; Sofaer, supra note 50, at 101.
252. Yoo, supra note 138, at 567.
253. See id.
254. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 23, at 922-23; Yoo supra note 2, at 10. Regarding
legality, Yoo argues for expanding the customary international law doctrine of anticipatory selfdefense to consider the likelihood that the probability of attack will increase if it is not immediately
addressed, whether diplomatic alternatives are practical, and the magnitude of the harm that could
result if action is not taken; such an expansion would likely legitimate U.S. military action in
Afghanistan. Yoo, supra note 138, at 574. If applied to Afghanistan, Sofaer's common-lawyer
approach would probably also find that U.S. military action was appropriate. Sofaer, supranote 2,
at 9-14.
255. See Layne, supra note 81, at 285.
256. See Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 60; Mearsheimer, supra note 66, at 11-12.
257. See Layne, supra note 81, at 285, 294.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 285-86.
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international instability, preponderance would have sanctioned the use of
force in Afghanistan. 260 The fact that Operation Enduring Freedom was a
multilateral undertaking would have led the preponderance strategy to
support it even more.261
The balancer of last resort and selective engagement strategies would
have also countenanced the U.S. use of force in Afghanistan.262 The
balancer strategy identifies defending U.S. territorial integrity as one of
only two American vital interests. 263 Attacks on the homeland create and
threaten the balancer strategy's vision of a stable U.S. insular economy.
Considering those points, the balancer strategy would have endorsed
American military action against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Like the balancer strategy, selective engagement also defines homeland
security as a vital U.S. interest.26 Moreover, the selective engagement
strategy expressly identifies terrorism as a significant threat to the United
States and encourages the use of preventive action to thwart it. 265 Thus,
based on its description of American vital interests, its stance on using
force preventatively, and its predilection that the United States act as part
of coalitions of the willing, the selective engagement strategy too would
have supported the U.S. decision to use force in Afghanistan.266
American military action in Afghanistan violated the international rules
governing the use of force. The United States did not have Security
Council authorization to use force in Afghanistan and, while it did have
the right to resort to force against al Qaeda in self-defense, its right of selfdefense did not extend to the Taliban. Because the United States could not
meet the Nicaraguastandard for imputing responsibility, its broad action
in Afghanistan violated the international use of force regime, as the
international legal academy tends to interpret it. Operation Enduring
Freedom was consistent with the balance-of-threat preponderance,
balancer, and selective engagement strategies. The preponderance strategy
maintains that the hegemon's security must be absolute and that
international instability affecting U.S. core interests should be stifled, the
balancer of last resort strategy holds that America must defend its
territorial integrity, and selective engagement insists that homeland
security is a vital U.S. interest warranting the preventive use of force.

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See id.
See Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 72-73; Walt, supra note 152, at 61.
See Layne, supra note 81, at 292.
Id.
Art, supra note 116, at 303.
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E. Gulf War I
The September 11 terrorist attacks directed the United States to sharpen
its focus on terrorism, rogue states, and the spread of WMD. This new
U.S. foreign policy emphasis renewed American interest in Iraq beginning
in fall 2002 and led the United States to seek to enforce the terms of the
cease-fire agreement that had ended the first Gulf War in 1991.267 Security
Council Resolution 687, which established the conditions of that ceasefire, required Iraq to, among other things, destroy its WMD stockpiles,
terminate its WMD programs, and allow U.N. verification inspections.268
Responding to the U.S. desire to bring Iraq into compliance with the terms
of Resolution 687 and eliminate the threat to international peace an Iraq
armed with WMD posed, the Security Council, on November 8, 2002,
adopted Resolution 1441, finding Iraq in material breach of the 1991
cease-fire and offering it a final opportunity to meet its obligations.2 69 The
United States, having determined that Iraq flouted its 1441 "opportunity,"
led a coalition of states in invading Iraq on March 19, 2003.270 Operation
Iraqi Freedom quickly toppled Saddam Hussein's regime and President
George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq on
May 1, 2003.271 The United States has since assumed the role of quelling
insurgents and rebuilding Iraq.
America's use of force in Operation Iraqi Freedom was, in the general
opinion of the international legal establishment, illegal. 72 Under the
Charter regime, a state may only use force if it has prior Security Council
authorization to do so or is acting in self-defense. 273 The U.S. invasion of
Iraq did not satisfy the requirements of state self-defense: Iraq had not
perpetrated an Article 51 armed attack and, according to the best
information available concerning what the United States knew on March
19, 2003, America did not face an imminent Iraqi attack. 274 The United
States claimed that it had prior Security Council approval to use force.2 75
It based this claim on Resolution 678, which authorized the use of force
in response to the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 276 According to the U.S.
267. S.C. Res. 687 (Apr. 3, 1991); Yoo, supranote 138, at 563.
268. S.C. Res. 687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
269. S.C. Res. 1441 (Nov. 8,2002); Yoo, supra note 138, at 563.
270. Yoo, supranote 138, at 563.
271. President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended, availableat
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.htmi (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
272. Franck, supra note 2, at 614; Yoo, supra note 2, at 729, 736.
273. Schachter, supranote 27, at 1625.
274. See Franck, supra note 2, at 611.
275. Id. at 614; Yoo, supranote 2, at 733-34.
276. Franck, supra note 2, at 612.
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argument, Iraq's material breaches of Resolution 687's cease-fire terms
during the 1990s and Resolution 1441's finding that Iraq remained in
material breach of those terms in 2002, terminated the Gulf War I ceasefire and restored Resolution 678, thereby reinstituting the Security
Council's 1991 authorization to use force against Iraq. 27
A great majority of the international legal academy joins France,
Russia, and China, all permanent members of the Security Council, in
dismissing that American argument .278 They maintain that the
authorization to use force contained in Resolution 678 pertained only to
the liberation of Kuwait and that it did not create a further mandate for
continued action against Iraq at the discretion of the United States.279
Moreover, most international legal scholars argue that Iraq and the
Security Council, not individual members of the coalition that liberated
Kuwait, are the parties to Resolution 687's cease-fire agreement and that,
therefore, it is up to the Security Council, and not its individual members,
28 °
to determine how to respond to Iraqi violations of the cease-fire's terms.
Furthermore, they insist that Resolution 1441, in addition to finding Iraq
in material breach, specifically addressed the issue of Iraqi noncompliance
by stating that the Security Council would "[re]convene ...in order to
consider the situation" and "remain seized of the matter."28 ' Based on
these widely accepted interpretations of Resolutions 678, 687, and 1441,
authorization to use force
the United States did not have Security
282 Council
illegal.
was
Iraq
of
invasion
and its
The balance-of-threat preponderance strategy would not have
supported the U.S. use of force in Operation Iraqi Freedom.283 Iraq was not
threatening core, status quo states. The fact that many such states protested
America's military action against Iraq attested to that. Iraq was also not a
source of creeping instability at the time of the U.S. invasion. The
preponderance strategy stresses the immense importance of U.S.
multilateral engagement.284 When the United States operates in a
multilateral fashion, it necessarily reduces the threat its hegemonic status
conveys.285 Because, despite the coalition that America was able to
organize, the great weight of international opinion came down against Gulf
277. Id. at 612-14.
278. Yoo, supranote 2, at 729, 736,742. For alternative arguments on the legality of Gulf War
II, see discussion of Sofaer and Yoo at note 247.
279. Franck, supra note 2, at 612-14.
280. Id.
281. Id.; S.C. Res. 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
282. Franck, supra note 2, at 612-14; Yoo, supra note 2, at 729-30, 736.
283. See Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 72; Walt, supra note 152, at 60-62, 76.
284. See Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 72; Walt, supra note 152, at 60-62, 76.
285. See Mastanduno, supra note 19, at 72; Walt, supra note 152, at 60-62, 76.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2007

31

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 2

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 19

War II, the preponderance strategy would have advised the United States
not to use force in Iraq.286
The balancer of last resort strategy would also not have countenanced
the American decision to use force against Iraq.287 Iraq did not directly
threaten U.S. territorial integrity or promise the rise of a Eurasian
hegemon. Iraq did not possess the ability to deliver the WMD it
purportedly had against the United States.288 Even if it had, according to
this strategy, U.S. military capability would have likely deterred Iraq from
using WMD against the United States. 28 9 The balancer strategy's emphasis
on America's relative power position would have also led it take note of
the tremendous expense an invasion of Iraq entailed.290 In combination,
these points would have prevented the balancer strategy from supporting
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Contrasting with the preponderance and balancer strategies, selective
engagement would have sanctioned the U.S. military action against Iraq.2 91
The selective engagement strategy specifically identifies rogue states
possessing WMD as the most serious threat to America's most vital
interest, homeland security. 292 At the time of the U.S. invasion, most states
presumed that Iraq possessed WMD.293 Iraq had also exhibited a
malevolent intent-witness its chemical attacks against its own citizens
and its attempted assassination of former U.S. President George H.W.
Bush. The strategy of selective engagement also supports using force
preemptively; it maintains that preventive action is more effective and less
expensive than responsive action. 294 The United States initiated its action
against Iraq in accord with that logic. Further, selective engagement
recommends that America act with coalitions of the willing.295 While it
might not have achieved the broad international support it would have
preferred, the United States was able to assemble an effective coalition.
Therefore, all considered, the selective engagement strategy would have
supported the U.S. decision to resort to force in Iraq.
Operation Iraqi Freedom, in the minds of most international lawyers,
violated the Charter-based use of force regime. The United States did not
286. See Mastanduno, supranote 19, at 72; Walt, supra note 152, at 60-62, 76.
287. See Layne, supranote 81, at 292.
288. See generally ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, IRAQ'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN 2002: A
DYNAMIC NET ASSESSMENT (2002).

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See Layne, supranote 81, at 295.
Id. 293-97.
See Art, supra note 116, at 303-13.
Id. at 306.
S.C. Res. 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
Art, supra note 116, at 301.
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have valid Security Council authorization to use force against Iraq and the
U.S. invasion did not constitute self-defense. The potential threat
aggressive U.S. behavior conveys and cost would have led the
preponderance and balancer strategies, respectively, to counsel against
America's decision to use force in Iraq. The selective engagement
strategy's views on rogue states, WMD, and preventive action would have
led it to support U.S. military action against Iraq.
Part IV demonstrated the extent of the divide that exists between actual
state practice and the U.N. Charter-based use of force regime. Three of the
five U.S. military involvements examined violated international law.
According to the current international rules governing the use of force,
U.S. actions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Gulf War II were illegal.
The balance-of-threat preponderance strategy's focus on international
stability and using multilateral processes to limit the threat American
power conveys would have led it to endorse the use of force in Gulf War
I, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, and argue against it in Somalia and Gulf War
H. The limited manner in which the balancer of last resort strategy defines
U.S. vital interests and its commitment to cutting American expenditures
in order to achieve a favorable relative power position would have made
it, by far, the least active among the three strategies. It would have only
sanctioned military action in Afghanistan.
While the balancer strategy would have been the least likely to use
force in violation of the Charter-based regime, it would also have been the
least likely to use force to protect the U.N. goals of international peace and
stability. Selective engagement would have agreed with the U.S. decisions
to use force in every case but Somalia. Its emphasis on preventive action
and its willingness to act counter to world opinion in order to protect vital
U.S. interests would have made it more open to using force than the
preponderance or balancer strategies.
V. CONCLUSION

The international legal community's extraordinarily narrow approach
to the international rules structure governing the use of force threatens to
make it wholly irrelevant. If any semblance of the U.N. Charter-based
regime is to remain meaningful and effective, it needs to be reevaluated
and reformulated. An international rules regime governing force must take
account of how states actually behave or risk falling by the wayside.
This Article has attempted to demonstrate that the international use of
force rules are, indeed, out-of-sync with actual state practice. States resort
to force to protect and advance their respective interests. International
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relations theory more generally and, with respect to security issues,
realism, in particular, can provide useful insights into how states define
those interests. Foreign policy strategies that identify such interests and
provide recommendations on how to defend them best can be derived from
realism for any state. Understanding how the United States calculates its
interests is crucial because its position in the hierarchy of states means that
it is likely to be the driving force behind any redefinition of the
international use of force regime.
The preponderance, balancer of last resort, and selective engagement
strategies have been developed from realist principles for the United
States. Their respective outlooks on U.S. decisions to use force in Gulf
War I, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Gulf War H demonstrate that
states can rationally determine how to define and defend their interests
using different approaches that lead to different outcomes. Any attempt to
update the international use of force rules structure should be cognizant of
that. A successful use of force regime, rather than seeking to eradicate the
use of force altogether, will take account of and seek to influence how
states identify their interests, and adequately distinguish uses of force that
promise to advance overall international peace and security from uses of
force that offer to destroy it.
The case-study analysis undertaken above suggests that a reformulated
international use of force regime would benefit from assuming the
balance-of-threat preponderance strategy's rationale. After all, the
preponderance strategy comports well with the U.N. Charter's dedication
to multilateralism and international peace and security, and is a fair
indicator of U.S. decisions to employ force. However, in order to be
successful, such a use of force regime would have to confront the gap that
can exist at times between multilateral authorization and the need to
maintain international stability. The gap between those elements would
have led the preponderance strategy to support U.S. actions in Kosovo and
Afghanistan despite their illegality under the current U.N. Charter-based
regime.
One way of addressing that gap would be for a reformulated regime to
adopt a "common-lawyer" like approach to rules governing the use of
force. Formally introduced by Professor Abram Chayes296 and, most
recently, developed and advocated by Professor Abraham Sofaer, 97 the
common-lawyer approach rejects the notion that only a limited number of
specific grounds exist to justify the use of force and, instead, evaluates
legality based upon all of the relevant circumstances surrounding a
296. See generally Abram Chayes, A Common Lawyer Looks at InternationalLaw, 78 HARV.
L. REv. 1396 (1965).
297. See generally Sofaer, supra note 2.
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decision to use force.298 The common-lawyer approach is a "practical,
multi-factor" approach to international law.2 99 It resolves legality by
weighing all pertinent facts against the standards and purposes of the U.N.
Charter. A decision to use force is considered legitimate if, under all the
relevant circumstances presented, it was reasonable in light of the
Charter's underlying purposes-namely, to maintain international peace
and security. °°
A reformulated regime might also benefit from expanding the concept
of imminence in a manner that more readily supports preemptive and
preventative action. Of the three realist foreign policy strategies examined
in this Article, the selective engagement strategy best approximates U.S.
decisions to use force. One of the most significant differences between the
preponderance and selective engagement strategies is the latter's propreventative action position. Broadening the constituent elements of
imminence would help account for the increased threats terrorism and
rogue states present today, and place a reformulated use of force regime
more in line with actual, contemporary state practice. The factors to be
considered in determining whether anticipated attacks are imminent could
be expanded to include, as Professor John Yoo has proposed, the
probability that the attacks will occur, the practicality of diplomatic
solutions, the need to utilize narrow windows of opportunity for action,
and the magnitude of the harm that the attacks could cause.3"'
A reformulated international use of force regime that adopts the logic
of the preponderance strategy may further benefit from instituting a
framework that incentivizes states, like the United States, to act in
situations that do not threaten international stability more generally. The
importance of this issue becomes apparent when it is considered that not
one of the three foreign policy strategies analyzed above would have
supported the U.S. decision to use force in Somalia. Perhaps a system of
financial reimbursement could be developed to lower the costs to states
taking part in military actions designed to stabilize areas that do not bear
significantly on international stability. Such a system might lead states to
enter unstable peripheral zones that they otherwise would not.
As a starting poir, , international legal experts seeking to establish a
reimbursement framework could look to the system that is currently in
place to reimburse states participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations

298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Yoo, supra note 138, at 574.
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under the command of the Secretary-General. 0 2 Article 17 of the U.N.
Charter permits the U.N. General Assembly to divide the expenses
associated with such operations among all Member-States in order to
reimburse states that have taken part in them for their efforts.3" 3 The
formula the General Assembly presently uses to assign percentages of the
total annual cost of peacekeeping operations to Member-States for
payment takes account of individual states' capacities to contribute. A
comparison of each Member-State's average per capita gross national
product over a six-year base period is used to determine that capacity."
A reformulated international use of force regime could employ a similar
method of equitable collective reimbursement as a means of incentivizing
states to act where they might not have before.
Whether or not a reformulated international use of force regime
incorporates these suggestions, it must evolve the rules governing the use
of force in a manner that takes account of how states actually define their
interests, or face the prospect of becoming a wholly irrelevant and
inconsequential institution.

302. For a general discussion of the differences between U.N. commanded peacekeeping
operations and U.N. authorized uses of force undertaken independently by Member-States, see
Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, 3 INT'L AFF. 453-55, 463
(1993).
303. U.N. Charter art. 17, para. 2.
304. Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of United Nations
PeacekeepingOperations,G.A. Res. 235, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 5th Comm., at 1-2, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/55/235 (Jan. 30, 2001); see also Implementation of GeneralAssembly Resolutions 55/235
and 55/236: A Report of the General-Secretary,G.A. Rep. 157, 58th Sess., at 3-4, U.N. Doc.
A/58/157 (2003); G.A. Res. 256, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 5th Comm., at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/58/256 (2003).
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